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Authority in Educational
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Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT The authority of educators in general, and the authority of the moral educator in
particular, are central and pervasive themes in John Wilson’s writings. This paper summarises
his account of authority in educational relationships, not simply by describing the results of his
analysis, but by reconstructing his views in terms of some basic distinctions between different
types of authority, in particular the distinction between practical and theoretical authority, and
the one between de jure and de facto authority. Next, the paper explores the rather neglected
topic of parental authority, applying the same distinctions between basic types of authority. It
is argued that the authority of the parent is in important respects different from the authority
standardly ascribed to the teacher. Finally, some comments are made on the complex question
of whether or not authoritative parental supervision is essential to the upbringing of children and
their growth into adult people.
John Wilson’s writings are, without doubt, a paragon of many academic skills and
intellectual virtues, but perhaps his most remarkable and admirable quality is his
vigorous critical attitude towards fashionable doctrines, dominant ideologies and
various forms of “political correctness” in both the theory and the practice of
education. Indeed, Wilson is a genuine example of an independent thinker, which
implies not only being critical and original in one’s  eld of expertise but also, and
in a way more demandingly, having the courage to defend one’s views publicly,
especially if those views are not very popular or are even received with hostility.
Take, for example, his account of the nature and function of conceptual
analysis. Nowadays conceptual analysis, if given a place at all, is standardly regarded
as a possibly useful but rather subordinated part of philosophical inquiry. However,
on the basis of penetrating meta-philosophical re ections, Wilson claims that con-
ceptual analysis, if interpreted properly, should be regarded as the Alpha and the
Omega of the philosophy of education. Moreover, quite contrary to the communis
opinio in recent philosophical thinking, he argues that conceptual analysis is best
conceived as a kind of objective examination of concepts that relate to inalienable
elements or necessary features of human existence. Conceptual analysis, he claims,
is not an inescapably value-infected activity but rather a non-ideological rational
enterprise. The things examined in this undertaking should not be conceived as
contingent or historical conceptual frameworks, but are to be taken as concepts and
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principles that are logically inevitable parts of the furniture of any conceivable world
with people in it (Wilson, 1986, pp. 60–80).
Not only is his metaphilosophical account of conceptual analysis indicative of
his critical and non-conformist attitude, but the same goes for his philosophical
analyses of particular concepts. A major example is his exploration of the concept of
authority. During the heydays of liberal and anti-authoritarian doctrines in the  eld
of education, Wilson repeatedly and persistently pointed out that certain forms of
authority and discipline are preconditions of effective education and serious learn-
ing. With reference to this relationship between authority and education, he even
argues that unquestioning obedience to the legitimate authority of the teacher
should be considered a virtue in a pupil—a view that was not received with approval
in educational circles, to put it mildly (Wilson, 1977, pp. 43–44).
Our  rst objective is to give a brief reconstruction of Wilson’s analysis of the
authority of educators, in particular by introducing and applying some basic distinc-
tions between different sense or type of authority. In line with his metaphilosophical
views, our global explanation of these fundamental distinctions is intended to be
completely neutral, which means, roughly, that the results of our analysis are
presented as being acceptable to all rational human beings, whatever their values or
ideological stance.
In the English-speaking world, philosophical accounts of the role of authority in
education almost naturally focus on the relation between the teacher and the pupil.
However, it is quite conceivable that the nature and function of authority in other
educational relationships, especially the one between the parent and the child, are
somewhat different. Our second objective is to give an outline of the authority of
parents, in particular by explaining its nature in terms of the aforemade distinctions
between different senses or types of authority. The basis of parental authority, we
shall claim, should be located in some fairly unsophisticated from of practical
wisdom regarding matters of prudence and morality.
At the end of our paper, we shall go brie y into the question of whether or not
parental authority is somehow or other an inevitable or indispensable feature of
human existence. We believe that parental authority is indeed inevitable in particular
respects, although perhaps not in Wilson’s logical sense of the term. However,
because of the many complexities of the question concerned, we shall not elaborate
and defend such a view in the present context. We shall restrict ourselves to some
preliminary work, in particular by pointing out that the question might be taken in
different ways, as well as by reframing the question in terms of a basic paradox of
upbringing.
Types of Authority
In discussing the topic of authority, in particular the supreme authority of the state,
political philosophers often distinguish between different senses or types of auth-
ority. Being clear about some of these distinctions, especially the relatively basic
ones, is not only important for discussing the authority of the state, but also essential
for getting a good grasp of the role and nature of authority in education, including
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moral education. Our aim is to give an outline of the basic types of authority and to
reconstruct Wilson’s views in terms of these.
Practical and Theoretical Authority
It is often noticed that a person may be said to have authority in two distinct senses:
we can speak of a person being in authority (paradigmatic examples are judges,
policemen and referees) and of a person being an authority (major examples are
prophets, experts and scholars). Following Joseph Raz (1986, pp. 29, 52–53, 64), we
shall call these types of authority practical and theoretical authority henceforth.
Although these expressions could cause some confusion, in a sense to be explained
presently, they have the advantage of giving some indication of the subject-matter
that is characteristic of the respective type of authority. A person who is said to be
a practical authority is supposed to have authority over conduct, whereas a person
who is considered a theoretical authority is expected to have authority over beliefs.
This distinction between conduct and belief is also re ected in the way R.S. Peters
de nes the corresponding types of authority, namely, as authorities in the sphere of
social control and authorities in the sphere of knowledge (Peters, 1966, p. 239).
However, using the adjectives “practical” and “theoretical” could also be somewhat
misleading, in particular because the subject-matter of theoretical authority is not
con ned to theoretical beliefs only, but may also include practical beliefs; that is,
roughly, beliefs about which conduct is right or wrong, good or bad, desirable or
undesirable. We have to keep this in mind especially when, in the next section, the
notion of practical wisdom will be introduced.
Although Wilson uses the terms very rarely, it is beyond doubt that he considers
the educator to be both in authority and an authority. Usually he introduces and
discusses the concept of practical authority as an element of a whole set of
interconnecting concepts, including “discipline”, “punishment”, “rule” and
“contract” (Wilson & Cowell, 1990, pp. 7–73). Education, he argues, has to do with
the planning of serious and sustained learning, and exercising practical authority is
necessary to ensure that such learning can in fact take place. Practical authority is
needed to maintain a suf ciently high degree of order and obedience, in particular
by enforcing a framework of rules which should guarantee that pupils do their
homework, pay attention to the teacher, do not bully each other, do not play truant,
or whatever disciplined behaviour is required for the purpose of serious learning.
The way in which Wilson approaches the theoretical authority of the educator
is by locating the corresponding notion in quite a different set of interrelated
concepts, in particular “reason”, “truth”, “forms of knowledge” and “disciplines”
(Wilson, 1990, pp. 17–43; 1993, pp. 55–61; Wilson & Cowell, 1990, pp. 76–77).
An aim all educators must aspire to, says Wilson, is to educate pupils out of
prejudice and into reason, especially by initiating them into disciplines or  elds of
enquiry constituted by particular rational procedures. Such an enterprise is hardly
conceivable without the guidance of educators who present themselves as experts in
the relevant disciplines or branches of enquiry. In the end, serious learning should
lead to the understanding of rational procedures inherent in the disciplines and the
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recognition of their authority. Educators can and must have theoretical authority in
so far as they are supposed to act as mediators between such procedures and the
pupils.
The general distinction between practical and theoretical authority can be
explained more fully by introducing the notion of having a right. Considering
someone a practical authority implies ascribing to the person a right to rule. In
relevant publications this right is explained in different but related ways, for
example, as the right to issue commands, to make decisions and to give orders, or
the right to lay down what the rules are, to apply those rules to particular cases, as
well as to enforce them.
According to D.D. Raphael (1990, pp. 166–167), the right to rule is not simply
a right of action or a liberty-right, but primarily a right of recipience or a claim-right.
Having a right of action simply means not having any legal or moral obligation to
refrain from doing so. A right of recipience, however, is a right to receive something,
a claim that someone else has an obligation to provide what the right-holder is
entitled to receive. Having such a claim-right is, we think, the essence of being in
authority. The right to rule implies a right to receive obedience, a claim towards other
people that they are obliged to obey one’s commands or to follow one’s prescrip-
tions. “If one has authority”, Wilson rightly observes, “the implication is that one is
and ought to be, at least characteristically, obeyed” (1977, p. 54).
This account of practical authority is the common view in political philosophy,
although there have been some rather unsuccessful attempts to challenge it (Raz,
1986, pp. 23–37). Could we explain the concept of theoretical authority in a
structurally similar way? Does being an authority in the sphere of knowledge also
imply having some right of recipience? We are inclined to answer these questions in
the af rmative. Having authority over beliefs also implies having a right—not, of
course, a right to rule but, as some authors have suggested, a right to be believed
(Peters, 1959, p. 18; Friedman, 1990, p. 57). Our guess is that this right, just like
the right to rule, should be taken as a right of recipience—not, of course, as a right
to receive obedience, but as a right to receive something that may be called assent,
that is, the acceptance or endorsement of one’s views or beliefs by others. To put it
differently, claiming to be a theoretical authority implies the claim towards some
others that they should believe what one says.
De Jure and de Facto Authority
Another well-known distinction between two senses or types of authority is the one
between de jure and de facto authority. It criss-crosses the distinction explained above
in such a manner that both practical and theoretical authority can be de jure and de
facto. In the preceding section we focused on the former sense of “practical” and
“theoretical authority”. Now we shall brie y compare the de jure sense with the de
facto sense.
Using the word “authority” in the de jure sense is making the normative claim
that some individual has a right to rule or a right to be believed. Asserting that
someone has authority in this particular sense is, roughly, making the twofold claim
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(i) that the individual claims to have a certain right, and (ii) that the person’s claim
is legitimate or well-justi ed. The study of de jure authority is the province of
philosophy, in particular the  elds of ethics, political philosophy and the philosophy
of education. The central task of this enterprise is to articulate and justify the
conditions of having legitimate practical or theoretical authority.
Using the word “authority” in the de facto sense, however, is making the
descriptive claim that some individual actually exerts a peculiar type of in uence over
other people’s conduct or beliefs. Maintaining that someone has authority in this
particular sense usually involves making the double claim (i) that the individual
claims to have a certain right, and (ii) that the person’s claim is in fact accepted or
acknowledged by those at whom it is directed (Wolff, 1990, p. 21). Research into de
facto authority is part of the empirical sciences, especially of the disciplines of
sociology, social psychology and developmental psychology. The main aim of this
type of research is to describe and explain the conditions of effectively exercising
practical or theoretical authority.
Wilson uses the terms de jure and de facto authority sporadically, only when he
discusses the relationship between authority and power (Wilson, 1981, pp. 45–46;
Wilson & Cowell, 1990, pp. 30–31). Moreover, although the role and nature of
authority are central themes in his work, any systematic account of the distinction
between the indicated types of authority is, to our knowledge, absent. Nevertheless,
Wilson has many interesting things to say about both the de jure and the de facto
authority of educators.
As already stated, he claims that educators should have de jure practical
authority and he justi es this claim by arguing that without having the right to rule
over children the effective and serious practice of education is well-nigh impossible.
However, he also offers a non-instrumental justi cation of the educator’s right to
determine how pupils should behave (Wilson, 1997, pp. 58–60; 1992, pp. 121–
122). In his opinion, traditional arguments advanced to justify this right, such as the
paternalistic argument that pupils are too young and too inexperienced to know
what their best interests are, cannot stand the test of criticism. The fatal  aw of these
arguments, he says, is that any appeal to the consent of the pupils is lacking. In his
view, practical authority is only legitimate if pupils can be construed as voluntarily
or contractually putting themselves in the hands of the educator. The educator’s
right to rule should be justi ed in terms of a deal: the educator promises the
pupils to educate them in a proper way, and in return for this the pupils have to
do what they are told, at least in speci ed areas. Only if pupils can be conceived as
more or less explicitly consenting to this deal or contract will the practical authority
of the educator be legitimate and therefore different from mere power or brute
force.
Wilson also considers the educator to be a de jure theoretical authority. As we
have indicated above, educators should be seen as theoretical authorities because it
may be expected that they have, in comparison with the pupils, superior skills,
knowledge and understanding, associated with particular disciplines or intellectual
practices. By virtue of these qualities, so it could be said, they have the right to be
believed, especially concerning the proper ways of thinking, the standards of judg-
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ments, the intrinsic goods, as well as the excellences and virtues that are internal to
the disciplines or branches of enquiry. It should be noted, however, that Wilson
regards the theoretical authority of educators as derivative of the authority of reason.
Finally, their right to be believed is justi ed in terms of the authority of the rational
procedures that are constitutive of the different intellectual enterprises. Educators
have de jure theoretical authority only in so far as their personal qualities properly
represent the impersonal procedures of reason. This justi cation, Wilson claims,
also holds true for theoretical authorities in the domain of moral education. Here,
too, a distinction can be made between content and form, in this case between
 rst-order moral beliefs and second-order rules of procedure which we must use to
assess the merits of those beliefs. Any theoretical authority of moral educators can
only be legitimate if it is based not on the alleged unquestionable authority of some
set of moral beliefs but on the authority of the formal standards of rational moral
thinking (Wilson, 1990, pp. 31–33; 1996, pp. 86–87).
The de facto practical authority of educators, too, is an important subject of
philosophical analysis in Wilson’s work. Of course, his justi cation of the de jure
authority of educators is at the same time a justi cation of why they should have de
facto authority. The claim that educators are to be assigned the right to rule and the
right to be believed implies logically the claim that pupils should actually obey their
prescriptions and believe what they say. However, Wilson also gives an account of
what it means to have de facto practical authority, in particular by analysing the
concept of discipline (Wilson, 1981, 37–46). Typical of people who are well-disci-
plined, he argues, is their obedience to established and legitimate authorities as such.
They have the tendency not just to observe the rules laid down by authorities but
also, and more importantly, to comply with those rules for the simple reason that
they take them as authoritative. Consequently, in order to be able to exert the
distinctive type of in uence involved in having de facto practical authority, educators
need pupils who are well-disciplined.
With reference to Wilson’s analysis of the concept of discipline, we can deepen
our grasp of the nature of de facto authority by differentiating it from rational
persuasion, on one hand, and coercive power on the other hand. If we exert an
in uence on other people by means of rational persuasion we offer them reasons for
acting in a certain way or believing certain things, and those others actually follow
our prescriptions or assent to our propositions because they grasp and acknowledge
the justifying force of the reasons given. This is de nitely not the kind of in uence
that is typical of having de facto authority, whether practical or theoretical. On the
contrary, in cases of de facto authority people do not make their obedience or assent
dependent on their own assessment of the merits of the things prescribed or the
validity of the beliefs advanced. Rather they abdicate their own judgement and
follow a prescription or accept a belief merely because of the fact that it is prescribed
or uttered by someone acknowledged by them to have authority (cf. Raz, 1986, pp.
38–40; Friedman, 1990, pp. 63–68). Wilson’s warning not to confuse an authority
with an adviser or consultant is therefore to the point. In giving advice, one is trying
to persuade someone else to do certain things by means of rational argument (cf.
Bollnow, 1959, pp. 78–86). But in acting as an authority, one expects someone else
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to obey “whether or not one’s particular commands are thought by the individual to
be wise, or pleasant, or on other grounds acceptable” (Wilson, 1995, p. 74).
On the other hand, exerting de facto authority should also be distinguished from
in uencing people by threatening them with sanctions. To be sure, there are
complicated connections between having practical authority and having the power to
enforce obedience. For example, characteristically people who are in authority are
also entitled to use force or to apply sanctions to secure compliance. It may be true
that without having the coercive power to bring about conformity a person will cease
to be seen as someone being in authority. Nevertheless, in cases of de facto practical
authority people are obeying an individual not because they fear the unpleasant
consequences if they do not, but because they recognise the person’s right to receive
obedience (cf. Peters, 1959, pp. 20–21; 1966, p. 239; Wilson, 1981, pp. 45–46).
Parental Authority
So far we have explained, as neutrally as possible, some basic distinctions between
senses or types of authority. We have also presented a brief account of Wilson’s view
on the authority of educators, in particular by reconstructing it in terms of the types
of authority discerned. From now on we shall  x our attention on parental authority,
in so far as it is maintained and expressed in bringing up children. Our intention is
to give a rough draft of the nature of parental authority by applying the distinctions
between the various types of authority, as well as by making a rather sketchy
comparison with the authority standardly ascribed to the teacher.
Parental Practical and Theoretical Authority
At schools and related institutes it is common practice to arrange and combine the
content of teaching activities according to different subjects or disciplines, such as
mathematics, science, biology, French or computer studies. Of course, there are
important and widely practised alternatives to traditional subject teaching. A major
example is so-called project learning, in which teaching activities are thematically
arranged, but wherever such alternatives are introduced, the common practice is to
make sure that the subject-transcending themes and tasks are approached from the
perspectives of the relevant subjects, for example, from a historical, linguistic or
geographical point of view. This, of course, presupposes some classi cation of the
contents of teaching according to subjects.
Given this central role of subjects and disciplines in teaching activities at
schools, it is quite natural to explain the theoretical authority of teachers primarily
in terms of these. In comparison with their pupils, teachers are expected to be
authorities on the content and form of different subjects or disciplines. They are
supposed to know what is the right or wrong way of doing things in a particular  eld,
to be capable of explaining the views and approaches defended in a certain domain,
or to function as a model of the virtues and ways of thinking internal to a particular
discipline. Empirical research shows that both parents and teachers are of the
opinion that introducing pupils into particular subjects is the most important task of
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teachers, and, consequently, that their theoretical authority primarily consists in
having the corresponding types of skills, knowledge and understanding (Klaassen &
Leeferink, 1998). This common-sense conception of the dominant role and associ-
ated authority of the teacher is re ected in many publications of philosophers of
education, including the writings of Wilson.
However, it would be strange to maintain that the parent, just like the teacher,
should have well-developed capacities of teaching some subject or the competence
of initiating children into some discipline. After all, schools and other arti cial
institutions are created because the theoretical authority that is linked with the
professional role of the teacher cannot be expected of parents. How, then, should
their theoretical authority be conceived?
The central task associated with the non-professional role of parents consists in
raising or bringing up their children. Our claim is that the theoretical authority
required for performing such a task should be located in a certain type and level of
practical wisdom. The kind of practical wisdom associated with parenthood predom-
inantly relates to matters of prudence and morality. Being practically wise, in this
particular sense, implies having some intrinsic commitment to prudential and moral
values, being capable to some extent of specifying and ordering these values in
variable circumstances through attention to the details of the case, being able to
make proper decisions on the basis of such practical deliberations, as well as having
some power to control the inclinations and temptations that are potentially threaten-
ing to the realisation of the decisions made.
Although such a complex of commitments and capacities may seem at  rst sight
rather demanding, it is important not to overestimate the level or degree of
sophistication of parental practical wisdom. It would be wrong, for example, to
explain the theoretical authority of parents in terms of Kohlbergian postconventional
thinking or the Aristotelian ideal of the fully virtuous person. Most of the parents
who are performing their task of upbringing well do not meet the standards of the
sophisticated forms of practical wisdom implied in such views. For the same reason,
Wilson’s account of practical wisdom is hardly acceptable as an interpretation of
parental theoretical authority. In our view, parents need to have deliberative capac-
ities for specifying moral values by reference to the relevant aspects of variable
circumstances. Requiring of parents that they also should have the capacity for
assessing the merits of such  rst-order values on the basis of second-order formal
principles, like the principle of universalisability, would be an example of setting the
standards too high.
In order to gain a better grasp of the capacities that are part of parental practical
wisdom, we should notice that the concept of upbringing is logically connected with
the concept of adulthood in two different but closely related ways. On one hand, the
growth of the child into an adult person is the intrinsic aim of upbringing. We
cannot bring up our children without having the more or less implicit intention of
promoting their growth into adult persons. On the other hand, bringing up children
is hardly conceivable without the concern and engagement of adult people. One
cannot help and support the child all along its way to adulthood without being an
adult oneself. Consequently, in order to be able to perform their task of bringing up
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children, parents need to have the mental equipment implied in having the status of
an adult. Typical of adult people is that they do not need the moral supervision and
paternalistic guidance that is generally seen as appropriate with regard to children.
They are supposed to be generally capable of determining for themselves which kind
of conduct should be regarded as virtuous in the light of prudential and moral
values, as well as to arrange their lives accordingly. The capacities for leading such
a relatively independent life are central components of parental practical wisdom.
Hence, it is only towards the child that the parent qua parent has the right to be
believed in prudential and moral affairs.
In publications on education, the practical authority of the teacher is almost
standardly explained in terms of the right to preserve the conditions of order in the
classroom or, more broadly, the right to enforce rules and regulations deemed to be
necessary for creating stability, peace and safety in the school at large. Thus
conceived, exercising practical authority is not an intrinsic part but an extrinsic aid
of teaching. The teacher’s commands and prescriptions should be obeyed in order
to create the conditions which facilitate or enable the performance of the task of
introducing the pupil to subjects or disciplines. According to Wilson teachers are in
a peculiar position, for they have the dual role of keeping order and teaching
(Wilson, 1981, p. 64). In line with the classical Herbartian distinction between
Regierung and Unterricht, the establishment of their practical authority is conceived
as separated from, and usually as prior to, exercising their theoretical authority. In
educational institutions, Wilson says, “we require a framework of legitimate order in
which to educate” (1990, p. 72).
The practical authority of parents is predominantly and most clearly expressed
in disciplining their children. In discipline encounters the parent stimulates the child
to do or to refrain from doing certain things by performing all kinds of activities,
such as prescribing and forbidding, warning and reprimanding, urging and exhort-
ing, making demands and giving orders. However, unlike the indicated relation
between keeping order and teaching at schools, such disciplinary activities are not
extrinsic aids but intrinsic parts of upbringing. Characteristically, they are not
performed with the intention of establishing the necessary conditions of effective
upbringing, but meant to produce or strengthen the habits and commitments that
are seen as important for prudential or moral reasons.
The claim that in exercising their practical authority parents are trying to raise
their children can be exempli ed by brie y introducing Aristotle’s view on early
emotional habituation (ethismos) (cf. Spiecker, 1999). At the beginning of the second
book of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that virtuous character is acquired
through habituation of the non-rational part of the soul. Such disciplinary activities,
he says, essentially involve practice and repetition. Much the same as learning a
craft, such as acquiring the skills for playing the harp, the affective capacities that are
part of the virtues are acquired by repeatedly doing the virtuous actions: “We
become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by
doing brave actions” (Aristotle, 1985, 1103a34–b1). Young children, however, do
not have the practical wisdom required for identifying those acts which are virtuous
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or good. Consequently, in order to become virtuous persons they need the supervi-
sion of someone who is already practically wise.
Whatever one may think of this view, it is reasonable to assume that parents
who are habituating the child in the way indicated are exerting their practical
authority. The parent is prescribing or ordering the child to perform the actions that
are virtuous and to refrain from those that are vicious, and the child is supposed to
obey the parental precepts and injunctions. It goes without saying that such activities
are intrinsic parts of upbringing, for in performing them, parents have the intention
of cultivating prudential or moral virtues. Moreover, in habituating their children,
parents are at the same time exercising their theoretical authority. By indicating or
explaining to the child which actions are just, kind, prudent or sensible under the
circumstances, they are making practical judgements and thus showing their practi-
cal wisdom. In other words, conceiving the expression of parental practical authority
as some kind of preparatory move for the exertion of parental theoretical authority,
would be mistaken. Generally speaking, parental discipline is tantamount to display-
ing both types of authority in one and the same movement of upbringing.
Parental de Jure and de Facto Authority
Claiming de jure authority is making the normative claim that one has a right to rule
or a right to be believed. Claiming parental de jure authority is making the twofold
claim that one has the right to tell one’s children what to do and the right to be
believed by them in matters of prudence and morality. How could such a claim be
justi ed, if at all?
Any plausible justi cation of parental de jure authority should be composed of
at least two major steps. First, it should be demonstrated that bringing up children
is well-nigh impossible or could hardly be successful without the lead of persons who
have and exercise the rights at issue. This step can be elucidated by drawing a
comparison with justifying the de jure authority of the teacher. Such a justi cation
would need to show that introducing pupils into subjects requires having and
exercising both the right to rule in the classroom and the right to be believed by
them in matters concerning those subjects. In a similar way, a justi cation of
parental de jure authority needs to show that bringing up children requires having
and exercising both the right to discipline them and the right to be believed by them
in prudential and moral affairs. Secondly, a reasonable case should be made for
assigning these particular rights to parents. Even if it could be demonstrated that the
task of bringing up children cannot be accomplished without having and exercising
those rights, it still needs to be shown that parents are suitable candidates for
performing such a task. This means that justifying reasons must be given for the
assumption that parents generally have the mental qualities or are in the right
position for exercising the indicated rights in a proper way. Given our account of
parental theoretical authority, at least some of those reasons should refer to the kind
of practical wisdom explained above. Just as properly exercising the rights involved
in the de jure authority of the teacher presupposes having certain mental qualities,
among other things the skills, virtues and forms of knowledge associated with
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particular subjects or disciplines, so properly exercising the rights inherent in
parental de jure authority presupposes having certain mental qualities, in this case
especially the commitments and capacities that are constitutive of a certain kind of
practical wisdom.
We shall return to the  rst step of the justi cation in the  nal section, when the
question will be addressed as to whether or not parental authority is an inevitable
aspect of the practice of bringing up children. Here we shall con ne ourselves to
making some observations concerning the second step of the justi cation. As already
stated, teachers need to possess particular mental qualities for exercising their de jure
authority in a proper way. Typical of our society is that all kinds of measures are
taken in order to make sure that teachers do indeed have the required qualities.
Before being allowed to perform the professional role of a teacher, one has to attend
a teacher training college, obtain the relevant certi cates and submit oneself to
selection procedures. Meeting such requirements is a precondition of gaining the
rights involved in the de jure authority of the teacher. Parents, too, need to have
particular mental qualities in order to be able to perform their task of upbringing
properly. However, comparable arrangements to ensure that they actually have such
qualities are completely absent in our society. Parents are not obliged to follow
courses or to submit themselves to particular tests before gaining the rights included
in parental de jure authority. On the contrary, standardly they have the right to
exercise authority over their children simply because they are their parents.
One may wonder whether the current practice of ascribing de jure authority to
parents is as it should be. Would it not be better to introduce some limited but
mandatory test for parents? To be sure, the mental qualities required for properly
exercising parental de jure authority are fairly moderate. As noticed above, the
capacities of deliberation and self-control involved in parental practical wisdom may
be expected of every adult person. This is probably one of the background reasons
for the common practice of giving parents authority over their children without any
prior checking. On the other hand, assuming that all parents do indeed have the
required qualities would obviously be far too optimistic. The fact that parents may
not be practically wise, or not wise enough, is recognised fully by the legislature. In
the  rst book of the Dutch Civil Code, different reasons are mentioned for restrict-
ing or even nullifying the right of parents to exercise authority over their under-age
children (cf. Steutel & Spiecker, 1999). Most of those reasons relate to certain
de ciencies in parental practical wisdom, for example severe mental disturbances,
abuse of parental power, serious neglect of the child’s interests, criminal behaviour,
as well as the general incapacity to ful l one’s duty to raise and care for the child.
However, the problem is that judicial interventions on the basis of such consider-
ations usually take place after much damage has been done. Part of this misery and
suffering could perhaps be prevented by checking the practical wisdom of parents
before giving them the de jure authority over their children.
Is it also possible to point out interesting differences between the de facto
authority of parents and teachers? Having de facto authority implies that one’s de jure
authority is acknowledged by those at whom it is directed, however implicitly. So if
the de jure authority of parents and teachers is different, their de facto authority will
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be different too. We might, however, delve somewhat deeper, by trying to locate
some differences in the kinds of things that motivate children and pupils to accept
the authority of the parent or the teacher. Perhaps not only are the justifying reasons
for ascribing de jure authority to parents and teachers different, but the motivating
reasons for recognising their right to rule and their right to be believed may be
different too.
According to R.T. Allen (1987, p. 21), an important condition of the pupil’s
general willingness to do what the teacher says is the personal authority or authori-
tativeness of the teacher. Weak teachers, he says, resort to the use of threats and
sanctions precisely because they lack this personal element of authority. This
observation, we think, is quite right, as it may be assumed that without having some
degree of “presence” teachers will have dif culties with keeping order in the
classroom. However, another, more pervasive condition of the teacher’s de facto
practical authority could be pointed out. It is a condition that is also essential to the
child’s acceptance of parental authority. What we have in mind here is a particular
attitude of the pupil or the child towards the teacher or the parent, namely, some
form and degree of trust.
As explained above, typical of having de facto theoretical authority is that others
accept one’s beliefs without making their assent dependent on their own assessment
of those beliefs. Such a form of in uence is hardly conceivable without trust, for if
those others mistrusted one’s knowledge, insight or expertise, they would surely not
surrender their judgement. In a comparable way, parents and teachers can only have
de facto theoretical authority if the child or the pupil puts some con dence in their
skills, wisdom, or powers of judgement. If this form of trust were entirely absent,
how, then, could they be willing to endorse or accept the beliefs and views of their
parents or teachers? Moreover, and to complete Allen’s observation, the kind of trust
that motivates children and pupils to recognise the theoretical authority of their
parents or teachers, will also be an important incentive for accepting their practical
authority. Indeed, given the close connection of the theoretical and practical auth-
ority of parents, the same form of trust will motivate children both to believe what
they say and to do what they command. However, it may also be assumed that the
faith of pupils in the capacities and qualities of their teachers will in uence deeply
their willingness to obey their prescriptions.
How exactly the object of the child’s or the pupil’s trust should be conceived,
could be disputed (cf. Spiecker, 1990), but it will be clear that the kind of trust lying
at the root of the acknowledgement of the authority of parents or teachers does not
relate merely to their cognitive skills and intellectual competences. If children and
pupils do recognise the authority of their parents or teachers, they will normally also
take it on trust that their intentions are basically good, as well as that the things they
have to learn are generally worthwhile and contributing to their own long-term
welfare. Children will be strongly disinclined to obey their parents or to endorse
their beliefs if they have doubts about the parents’ willingness to promote their
interests. Pupils will be hesitant about acknowledging the authority of the teacher if
they are mistrustful of the teacher’s claim that the things they have to learn are
valuable or contributing to a  ourishing life.
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Given the fact that trust is a basic condition of the de facto authority of both the
parent and the teacher, the next question is how the establishment of this complex
attitude could be explained. Which factors do stimulate or motivate children or
pupils to trust their parents or teachers in the indicated way? In order to give a
well-founded answer to this question, we would need to perform detailed empirical
research. All we can do here is to present some rather global speculations that have
an aura of plausibility.
To begin with, one of the factors that will probably enhance the pupil’s trust is
the teacher’s faithful representation of the subject or discipline to which the pupil is
introduced. Teachers may inspire the pupil’s con dence by acting as a genuine
exemplar of the virtues, skills and habits of mind associated with particular subjects
or disciplines, as well as by showing in different ways that their intrinsic engagement
with those practices enriches their lives (Peters, 1966, pp. 259–260; Strike, 1999).
Other qualities of teachers may also be helpful, in particular their care and respect
for their pupils. Without being treated kindly and fairly, pupils will feel reluctant to
put their trust in the teacher. Moreover, all kinds of background conditions will also
affect the pupil’s trust; for example, whether or not their parents attach value to
being introduced into particular subjects, or the extent in which teachers are
respected and schooling is seen as worthwhile among the public at large. As Strike
(1999) makes clear, teachers will have dif culties with inspiring trust if their pupils
belong to communities that devalue the life of the mind or that are suspicious of
secular knowledge.
Similar factors may play a signi cant role with regard to children’s attitude of
trust towards their parents. Children’s trust will be reinforced if their parents prove
to be sincere exemplars of the prudential and moral virtues they are supposed to
teach them. Also, being embedded in a community in which respect for parents is
pervasive will stimulate children to place con dence in their parents. In one
important respect, however, the conditions that generate children’s trust in their
parents are different from those that may induce pupils to trust their teachers. What
seems to us a precondition of children’s trust is a loving relationship with their
parents. The love of parents for their children, and the love of children for their
parents, are sui generis. From the very beginning, parents show their love for their
children by taking care for them and securing their safety, by ful lling their needs
and supporting their sense of competence, by taking pleasure in their presence and
giving them the feeling that they are deeply wanted. Children will experience and
recognise the unconditional affection of their parents, which will arouse and stimu-
late their love for them. This mutual loving relationship is the breeding ground of
the child’s trust in the parent’s intentions and capacities. It is this kind of trust that
is a precondition of the child’s general willingness to accept parental authority (cf.
Langeveld, 1971, pp. 55–56; Rawls, 1971, pp. 462–467).
Some Final Considerations
When discussing Wilson’s account of philosophical analysis in the introductory
section, and also in our exploration of the de jure authority of parents, we touched
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upon the question whether or not parental authority could be regarded as inevitable
or indispensable. To conclude our paper, we would like to make some comments on
this intricate question.
In order to tackle the question, we should make a careful distinction between
two different ways in which parental authority may be considered indispensable or
vital. First, we might argue that parental authority is essential to upbringing.
Performing the task of bringing up children presupposes having a standing desire
that they will behave in a proper way. If we do not generally want our children to
do the things that are virtuous from a prudential or moral viewpoint, we can hardly
be said to be engaged in the practice of upbringing. However, children, particularly
when they are young, do not yet have the practical wisdom needed to determine
what is right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, reasonable or unreasonable under
the circumstances. As explained above, part of what it means to have the status of
an adult person is that one has the capacities of deliberation involved in the kind of
practical wisdom that may be expected of parents. Because children are by de nition
not adult people they will lack such capacities, or will only have them in a
signi cantly underdeveloped form. Consequently, in order to do the things that are
right, prudent or virtuous under the circumstances, children need the supervision of
their parents or other guardians who are practically wise. They must be generally
willing to do the things that we, as adult people, tell them to do. Indeed, what makes
parental authority legitimate is that children are likely better to comply with
prudential or moral reasons which apply to them if they accept the directives of their
parents.
Although this argument is far from watertight, we believe that it can be spelled
out more fully in such a manner that it will do all the work it is supposed to do.
However, the claim that exercising parental authority is an indispensable part of
bringing up children should not be confused with the rather different claim that
parental authority is vital to the development of the child into an adult person. In
order to justify the latter claim, we should do much more than just offering a
justi cation of the former claim. For even if it could be demonstrated that bringing
up children is not possible without authoritative parental supervision, it still needs
to be shown that the child’s growth into an adult person will be impossible without
such upbringing.
This is hardly the place to examine the possibility of justifying the second claim.
In order to do that properly, we should enter into a discussion with the German
representatives of the so-called Antipa¨dagogik, who are not only opposed to particu-
lar forms of upbringing, but reject any kind of upbringing whatsoever (Von Braun-
mu¨hl, 1975). Instead of discussing their arguments, we would like to end our paper
by pointing out that the second claim actually implies a kind of paradox, which may
be called the paradox of upbringing. It can be formulated in different ways: only by
supervising our children can they grow into people who no longer need our
supervision; or: following the parent’s lead is a precondition of leading one’s life
independently; or: only by treating our children as unequals they will become our
equals; or, to put it more catchily: children can only grow into adults by treating
them as children. It is this paradox that has to be dealt with.
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